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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
THOMAS COLLENTINE, JR., et aI.., 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Civil Action File No. 
2012CV214140 
v. 
MORGAN STANLEY & CO., INC., et aI., 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS TO COMPEL 
Before this Court are two ' Motions to Compel: Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Documents 
from Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co. ("Goldman") and Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 
Documents from Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated ("Merrill 
Lynch"). The parties, through several meet and confer discussions, have limited the scope of the 
documents requested and agreed on many issues. The final issue remaining in these motions is 
whether Plaintiffs may seek to compel production of documents from non-party affiliates of 
Defendants: Merrill Lynch Professional Clearing Corp. ("MLPRO") (an affiliate of Merrill 
Lynch) and Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P. ("GSEC") and Goldman Sachs 
International ("GSIL") (affiliates of Goldman) (collectively, "Affiliates"). The facts of the case 
have been laid out in prior orders of the Court, including the Court's Order on Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss filed contemporaneously with this Order and will not be repeated here. 
I Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Documents from Defendant Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. and Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Compel Documents from Defendant UBS Securities, LLC are moot as UBS and Morgan 
Stanley have represented to the Court that they have resolved all issues with Plaintiffs. 
1 
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to 
the subject matter involved in the pending action ... It is not ground for objection that the 
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears to be 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." O.C.G.A. § 9-11- 
26(b)(1). In defining relevancy, the Supreme COUli of Georgia recently stated, "in the discovery 
context, courts should and ordinarily do interpret 'relevant' very broadly to mean any matter that 
is relevant to anything that is or may become 8.11 issue in litigation." Bowden v. Medical Center, 
Inc., 773 S.E. 2d 692, 696 (2015) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 
351 n. 12 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Plaintiffs have requested Trading Records held by each of the Affiliates reflecting the 
selling and lending transactions involving Raser stock. According to the July 27, 2015 Affidavit 
of John D'Ercole, one of Plaintiffs' attorneys, the "Trading Records" sought include: 
FROM MERRILL: (1) Blue Sheets or Equivalent Trading Data, the Stock Record, and 
the Journal Record for MLPRO and MUL2 and (2) complete stock loan data for Merrill, 
MLPRO, and MUL and the "Hard to Borrow List," "Good to Borrow List," "Easy to Borrow 
List," or equivalent information in its possession, custody and/or control, for Raser stock. 
FROM GOLDMAN: (1) Blue Sheets or Equivalent Trading Data, the Stock Record, and 
the Journal Record for GSEC and GSIL and (2) complete stock borrow and loan data for 
Goldman, GSEC and GSIL. 
2 Plaintiffs initially sought documents from a second Merrill Lynch affiliate, Merrill Lynch International 
("MLIL") but they have resolved this dispute in meet and confer discussions. 
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Plaintiffs allege that Defendants used these Affiliates to bOlTOW stocks to lend to its U.S. 
customers to close out short positions. Plaintiffs argue the Affiliates' Trading Records are 
relevant to establishing Defendants' liability and Plaintiffs' damages and have presented an 
Affidavit and Reply Affidavit from Michael Rosen, a securities trading analyst retained by the 
Plaintiffs explaining how these requested documents are critical to establish stock manipulation. 
I. Merrill Lynch and MLPRO 
Plaintiffs argue MLPRO is wholly owned and controlled by Merrill Lynch and is 
inextricably intertwined in Merrill's trading activities concerning Raser stock. Merrill Lynch 
and MLPRO were linked through an Intercompany Settlement Process ("ISP") which allowed 
MLPRO to transfer its settlement and clearance obligations to Merrill Lynch. In 2014, FINRA 
found that these transfers violated the close-out requirements of Regulation SHOo Merrill Lynch 
included financial results of MLPRO in its "Consolidated Financial Statements" publicly filed 
with the SEC. Plaintiffs argue many of the transactions between Merrill and MLPRO were 
accomplished through intercompany journal entries and not actual trading. Specifically, 
Plaintiffs allege MLPRO hid its short positions in Merrill's books for 1,271,248 shares of Raser 
stock through journal entries without any actual selling activity. While Plaintiffs have gotten 
records from one side of certain transactions-trades executed through Merrill Lynch-they 
have not gotten trading records when Merrill Lynch was not the executing broker or was the 
contra party to the securities transaction with Merrill Lynch, or when MLPRO engaged in a stock 
or loan transaction with Goldman, Morgan Stanley, or UBS. Plaintiffs assert that MLPRO 
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docwnents will serve as an important cross-check for data they have already obtained from 
Merrill Lynch. 
In response, Merrill Lynch first notes that Plaintiffs subpoenaed records directly from 
MLPRO in New York where it is headquartered back in 2013. MLPRO objected on relevance, 
privacy, and other grounds. Instead of challenging those objections to the subpoena in New 
York, Plaintiffs are seeking these records indirectly through Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch 
further argues the Affiliates are separate corporate entities with separate businesses and separate 
client bases, and that there are no allegations of wrongdoing against the Affiliates in this action. 
MLPRO is registered as a separate broker-dealer with the SEC and provides its own responses to 
inquiries from the SEC. Merrill Lynch acknowledges that it has provided settlement and 
securities lending services to MLPRO but asserts that these practices were conducted under a 
clearing agreement and not as a result of any overlap between the entities' operations. They 
argue that Rosen says nothing about how MLPRO records will help evaluate Merrill Lynch's 
conduct, particularly since Merrill Lynch has already provided Plaintiffs with complete records 
of all the intercompany transactions. They also argue Rosen misinterpreted Merrill Lynch's 
trade data and that the data provided does not show any wrongdoing by MLPRO such as failure 
to deliver Raser shares ("naked short selling"), but only shows that MLPRO was short selling 
Raser stock. Thus, Merrill Lynch asserts this request for documents is an impermissible fishing 
expedition. Merrill Lynch asserts it has already produced documents showing any intercompany 
transactions involving Raser securities, but has not produced MLPRO client trading and position 
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data. Merrill Lynch argues MLPRO's individual clients' privacy interests outweigh Plaintiffs' 
need for this information. 
While Plaintiffs could have filed a motion to compel responses in accordance with their 
MLPRO subpoena in New York, Merrill Lynch cites no authority that prohibits Plaintiffs from 
seeking relevant documents in Merrill Lynch's custody and control. While Merrill Lynch argues 
it and MLPRO are separate companies, it does not argue MLPRO's Trading Records are not 
within its custody or control. See O.C.G.A § 9-11-34(a)(1) (allowing a party to request any 
designated documents "which are in the possession, custody, or control of the party upon whom 
the request is served."). Nor does it argue that the production ofMLPRO's documents would be 
unduly burdensome. 
The Court has weighed the potential relevance of the MLPRO Trading Records against 
non-party MLPRO's right to privacy and the privacy rights of its clients. See S. Outdoor 
Promotions v. Nat 'I Banner Co., 215 Ga App 133, 134 (1994) (finding appellant's right to 
privacy substantially outweighs the de minimis relevancy of discovery request for IRS 
documents); Borenstein v. Blumenfeld, 151 Ga App. 420, 421 (1979) ("the competing interest in 
an individual's right to privacy must be accommodated in the discovery process" and interests of 
judgment do not require production of financial document when there are other discovery 
methods available to get the same information). Merrill Lynch, the sole Merrill Lynch entity 
named in this suit, has provided its Trading Records for Raser stock transactions, but Plaintiffs 
seek to cross-check Merrill Lynch's Trading Records with those ofMLPRO and piece together 
the entire trading history. The Court agrees that any privacy concerns in keeping MLPRO's and 
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MLPRO's clients' financial and trading information private are protected under the Protective 
Order dated June 17,2013. For that reason, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Documents from 
Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated is GRANTED. 
II. Goldman, GSEC, and GSIL 
Plaintiffs argue GSEC and GSIL are inextricably intertwined in Goldman's trading 
activities. Goldman purportedly centralizes all its stock borrow functions under one centralized 
stock loan/borrow desk that services both OSEC and OSIL. Plaintiffs argue Goldman has the 
ability to request the documents from GSEC and OSIL because they are all owned by the same 
parent, share operational systems, and report their financial results on a consolidated basis. 
Plaintiffs contend Goldman and OSEC share the same electronic trading platform and OSEC's 
trading records of its clients are available to Goldman through this platform. See Lion Antique 
Cars & Investments, Inc. v. Tafel, 332 Oa. App. 824,826 (2015), cert. denied (Oct. 5,2015) 
(upholding trial court's order for corporation to produce documents possessed by a separate 
company because "there was also evidence of a close, longstanding relationship" between 
corporation's president and separate company and corporation was subsequently able to obtain 
some of the documents from the separate company, which shows some measure of control over 
the documents, despite the fact that the documents were in the separate company's possession). 
According to Plaintiffs, the GSEC and GSIL documents are relevant because GSEC is 
involved as a borrower and lender of Raser stock to Goldman to cover short positions and 
records show GSIL lending stock to Goldman. Plaintiffs argue the Trading Records supplied by 
Goldman are insufficient for the same reason the Merrill Lynch trading records are-they do not 
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reflect the contra side of the securities transaction or where Goldman was not the executing 
broker thus making it impossible to piece together the full inter-company trading relationship 
between Goldman and its Affiliates. 
Unlike Merrill Lynch, Goldman expressly states that GSIL and GSEC's documents are 
not within Goldman's possession, custody, or control. See O.C.G.A § 9-11-34(a)(1). Goldman 
responds that GSEC and GSIL are not wholly owned subsidiaries of Goldman, but are "sister" 
corporations sharing a common corporate parent, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. It argues that 
Plaintiffs have failed to show that Goldman "controls" its sister corporations such that GSEC and 
GSIL are alter egos or agents of Goldman. Goldman relies on federal cases that have found that 
a sister company did not have "control" over another sister company. See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. 
v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 257, 263 (D. Del. 1979) (noting that corporate litigants have been 
required to produce documents from separate corporate entities, most commonly when parent 
corporation must produce documents of wholly owned subsidiary, but finding that a company 
with different legal and commercial interests at stake should not have its rights determined in 
absentia unless the companies are so intertwined as to render meaningless their separate 
corporate entities). Plaintiffs served a subpoena in New York in January of2014 seeking 
documents from non-party GSEC, and filed a motion for Letters Rogatory in the United 
Kingdom in May of2014 in order to obtain documents from GSIC, a United Kingdom 
corporation. Instead of challenging those objections to the subpoena in New York or the UK, 
Plaintiffs are seeking these records indirectly through Goldman. According to Goldman, the 
motion filed in the UK was withdrawn. Further, there are no allegations of naked short selling 
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against the Affiliates in this action and Goldman argues that all short selling of Raser stock 
would be reflected in the Goldman Trading Records already produced. Finally, Goldman, like 
Merrill Lynch, argues that third parties' privacy interests outweigh any possible relevance. 
To the extent the GSIL and GSEC documents are in Goldman's control by virtue of the 
consolidated operations, most notably, the trading platform, the Court finds that Goldman has a 
duty to produce the documents requested from GSEC and GSIL under Georgia law. Further, as 
discussed above, since Plaintiffs allege Goldman used its Affiliates to hide its naked short 
selling, the records are likely to lead to the discovery of relevant information. Finally, the Court 
does not believe that the potential relevance is outweighed by privacy concerns. The documents 
are subject to the Court's Protective Order, discussed above. Further, the COUli does not believe 
the privacy concerns are heightened when a foreign company's Trading Records are being 
sought, particularly when the Trading Records are for securities held in a u.s. Company, traded 
in the U.S. market, and are being sought from a U.S. corporation. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion 
to Compel Documents from Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co. is GRANTED. 
SO ORDERED this -+ day of April, 2016 
Su eri Iton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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